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 Investigation of Integration and Potential 
Confl icts for Distributed Maritime Operations 
and Integrated Air and Missile Defense
LT Justin Davis, USN, Dr. Paul Beery, Ph.D., Dr. Eugene Paulo, Ph.D.
Abstract
Th is paper examines the integration of the Distributed 
Maritime Operations (DMO) concept with Integrated Air 
and Missile Defense (IAMD). Th at examination is supported 
by a review of both existing IAMD guidance as well as DMO 
relevant literature, culminating with development of an 
architectural representation of the integrating challenges 
between the two missions. Th e operational elements of the 
architecture are implemented in a discrete event simulation, 
which examines the impact that weapon characteristics and 
employment strategies have on both off ensive impact and 
defensive capability. Statistical analysis identifi es the design 
and operational decisions that have the largest impact on 
eff ectiveness. Analysis indicates that an off ensively oriented 
force executing DMO tactics against a near peer adversary 
has the potential to increase lethality by approximately 11% 
but also suggests that this improvement is associated with 
increased attrition to the employing force.
Introduction
Modern naval warfare has evolved dramatically in the past 
century. U.S. naval forces have focused primarily on defensive 
weapon system development. Th is can been seen through an 
examination of the recent U.S. Navy major ship system devel-
opments, specifi cally the AEGIS Weapon System (AWS), Ships 
Self Defense System (SSDS), and even Aegis Ballistic Missile 
Defense (ABMD) System. All these systems have one key 
theme in their development: defense of assets. 
Recently, there has been a shift  in the warfi ghting mental-
ity of some key Navy leaders; specifi cally, the Naval Warfare 
Development Command (NWDC) and Richardson (2018) are 
showing a renewed interest in developing off ensive capabili-
ties. Development of these off ensive capabilities has spurred 
increased attention to the pursuit of key technologies as well 
as the pursuit of refi ned doctrine and tactics that will allow 
maritime forces to project off ensive power in forward de-
ployed and contested environments. An emerging concept in 
this buildup of off ensive capability is Distributed Maritime 
Operations (DMO).
Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO)
Th e key tenet of DMO is to keep the enemy at risk, at range—
that is, their asset commanders must feel a sense of danger 
while being forced to maintain safe distances from perceived 
adversarial forces. A key enabler of this tenet is maintaining 
Battlespace Awareness (BA), which is defi ned by the U.S. Navy 
Information Dominance Roadmap 2013–2028 as “the abili-
ty to understand the disposition and intentions of potential 
adversaries as well as the characteristics and conditions of the 
operations environment” (DON 2013). Th e situational aware-
ness gained through comprehensive BA allows commanders to 
understand their environment and further disrupt adversarial 
forces intended tactics using DMO. Incorporating the DMO 
concept involves geographically distributing naval forces. Th is 
helps to create an increased level of uncertainty in the mis-
sion planning of opposing forces. Th is uncertainty creates a 
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perceived risk for the enemy commanders and therefore may 
result in delayed troop movements or in the abandonment of a 
preconceived mission set. 
When executed properly a distributed force will have the 
ability to keep enemy forces at greater ranges. Th e ability to 
keep forces at range is dependent upon the capabilities of 
the naval forces to project power. When friendly forces have 
systems that allow for the projection of power at greater ranges 
than the enemy forces, then the opposing force commanders 
will have to consider this increased risk, which will keep their 
forces distributed and at increased range from the objective. 
Th erefore, by properly executing the DMO concept, friendly 
forces experience an increased level of security, which enables 
increased sea control in a given maritime domain.
Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD)
Th is emphasis on power projection is vitally important to 
increasing the off ensive capability of a naval force; naval 
warfare is not restricted to a single domain or concept such 
as DMO. Th e evolution of warfi ghting has led to the require-
ment to fi ght in a multi-domain warfare environment. No 
longer is a naval surface unit able to only perform local air 
defense, a unit must now perform air defense and missile 
defense missions in concert with one another. Joint Publica-
tion 3–01 defi nes Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) 
as “Th e integration of capabilities and overlapping operations 
to defend the homeland and United States national interests, 
protect the joint force, and enable freedom of action by negat-
ing an adversary’s ability to create adverse eff ects from their 
air and missile capabilities” (CJCS 2017). Simply stated IAMD 
is a mission set that includes both air defense (AD) and bal-
listic missile defense (BMD).
Th e advent of IAMD highlighted the vital importance that 
anytime a new concept is derived, time and research must 
be devoted to consider the implication of this new concept. 
Specifi cally, the combination of AD and BMD to evolve to 
what is now known as IAMD came with some complications. 
Morton (2016) points out that it was not until the development 
of the multi-mission signal processor (MMSP) for the SPY-1D 
radar that this capability (IAMD) could be realized. Th e earlier 
BMD computer suites utilized separated signal processers and 
that resulted in a degradation of AD capability while operat-
ing in BMD mode (Morton 2016). Th e new MMSP reduced 
the burden on the crew while increasing the eff ectiveness of 
the SPY-1D radar suite and provided enhanced engagement 
capability in littoral environments as well as engagements 
against sea skimming anti-ship cruise missiles in high-clutter 
environments. To this end, the DMO mission must also be 
evaluated for potential architectural elements that may be 
saturated or overtasked.
Research Methodology
Th is research is focused on identifi cation of architectures that 
can satisfy IAMD performance standards in the context of a 
DMO mission. Note that, on the surface, the two concepts have 
elements that are incongruent. Specifi cally, DMO is intended 
to support off ensive, distributed operations by searching for 
adversary forces using passive measures. In contrast, IAMD is 
typically a defensive, concentrated activity that utilizes active 
search for adversary forces. By identifying the shared resources 
and modeling their interactions, potential constraints in design 
are isolated and high performing force compositions (in both 
DMO and IAMD missions) are identifi ed. Th e fi rst step in 
evaluating the interactions of IAMD and DMO is to defi ne a 
combined architecture to be modeled and analyzed. Th is paper 
is based on Davis (2017) and adapts the Model Based Systems 
Engineering Methodology for Employing Architecture in 
Systems Analysis (MBSE MEASA) from Beery (2016), which 
describes a methodology for employing architecture in system 
analysis and employs a mission engineering approach, as 
presented by Beery and Paulo (2019). Per the structure of the 
MBSE MEASA, this paper presents a sequenced defi nition of 
requirements, architectures, simulation models, and opera-
tional analysis. Th e paper fi rst defi nes clear requirements for 
combined DMO/IAMD missions, and then develops function-
al and physical architecture as shown in steps two and three 
of the MBSE MEASA process. Step four of the MBSE MEASA 
process is executed using ExtendSim soft ware and a robust 
design of experiments (DOE). Th e paper concludes by using 
standard statistical methods to conduct the analysis shown in 
step fi ve of the MBSE MEASA. Th at process is employed to 
accomplish two research objectives:
1. Utilize standardized systems architecture tools and tech-
niques to identify potential confl icts and integration chal-
lenges for IAMD and DMO
2. Develop and analyze a discrete event simulation consistent 
with the systems architecture that identifi es key perfor-
mance drivers and operational decisions that assess poten-
tially confl icting requirements for IAMD and DMO
Architecture Development
Th is paper leverages the Tier 1 Integrated Air and Missile 
Defense architecture created for the Joint Chiefs of Staff  by 
the J6 directorate. By examining the existing IAMD architec-
ture an understanding of the system can be developed, which 
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perceived risk for the enemy commanders and therefore may 
result in delayed troop movements or in the abandonment of a 
preconceived mission set. 
When executed properly a distributed force will have the 
ability to keep enemy forces at greater ranges. Th e ability to 
keep forces at range is dependent upon the capabilities of 
the naval forces to project power. When friendly forces have 
systems that allow for the projection of power at greater ranges 
than the enemy forces, then the opposing force commanders 
will have to consider this increased risk, which will keep their 
forces distributed and at increased range from the objective. 
Th erefore, by properly executing the DMO concept, friendly 
forces experience an increased level of security, which enables 
increased sea control in a given maritime domain.
Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD)
Th is emphasis on power projection is vitally important to 
increasing the off ensive capability of a naval force; naval 
warfare is not restricted to a single domain or concept such 
as DMO. Th e evolution of warfi ghting has led to the require-
ment to fi ght in a multi-domain warfare environment. No 
longer is a naval surface unit able to only perform local air 
defense, a unit must now perform air defense and missile 
defense missions in concert with one another. Joint Publica-
tion 3–01 defi nes Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) 
as “Th e integration of capabilities and overlapping operations 
to defend the homeland and United States national interests, 
protect the joint force, and enable freedom of action by negat-
ing an adversary’s ability to create adverse eff ects from their 
air and missile capabilities” (CJCS 2017). Simply stated IAMD 
is a mission set that includes both air defense (AD) and bal-
listic missile defense (BMD).
Th e advent of IAMD highlighted the vital importance that 
anytime a new concept is derived, time and research must 
be devoted to consider the implication of this new concept. 
Specifi cally, the combination of AD and BMD to evolve to 
what is now known as IAMD came with some complications. 
Morton (2016) points out that it was not until the development 
of the multi-mission signal processor (MMSP) for the SPY-1D 
radar that this capability (IAMD) could be realized. Th e earlier 
BMD computer suites utilized separated signal processers and 
that resulted in a degradation of AD capability while operat-
ing in BMD mode (Morton 2016). Th e new MMSP reduced 
the burden on the crew while increasing the eff ectiveness of 
the SPY-1D radar suite and provided enhanced engagement 
capability in littoral environments as well as engagements 
against sea skimming anti-ship cruise missiles in high-clutter 
environments. To this end, the DMO mission must also be 
evaluated for potential architectural elements that may be 
saturated or overtasked.
Research Methodology
Th is research is focused on identifi cation of architectures that 
can satisfy IAMD performance standards in the context of a 
DMO mission. Note that, on the surface, the two concepts have 
elements that are incongruent. Specifi cally, DMO is intended 
to support off ensive, distributed operations by searching for 
adversary forces using passive measures. In contrast, IAMD is 
typically a defensive, concentrated activity that utilizes active 
search for adversary forces. By identifying the shared resources 
and modeling their interactions, potential constraints in design 
are isolated and high performing force compositions (in both 
DMO and IAMD missions) are identifi ed. Th e fi rst step in 
evaluating the interactions of IAMD and DMO is to defi ne a 
combined architecture to be modeled and analyzed. Th is paper 
is based on Davis (2017) and adapts the Model Based Systems 
Engineering Methodology for Employing Architecture in 
Systems Analysis (MBSE MEASA) from Beery (2016), which 
describes a methodology for employing architecture in system 
analysis and employs a mission engineering approach, as 
presented by Beery and Paulo (2019). Per the structure of the 
MBSE MEASA, this paper presents a sequenced defi nition of 
requirements, architectures, simulation models, and opera-
tional analysis. Th e paper fi rst defi nes clear requirements for 
combined DMO/IAMD missions, and then develops function-
al and physical architecture as shown in steps two and three 
of the MBSE MEASA process. Step four of the MBSE MEASA 
process is executed using ExtendSim soft ware and a robust 
design of experiments (DOE). Th e paper concludes by using 
standard statistical methods to conduct the analysis shown in 
step fi ve of the MBSE MEASA. Th at process is employed to 
accomplish two research objectives:
1. Utilize standardized systems architecture tools and tech-
niques to identify potential confl icts and integration chal-
lenges for IAMD and DMO
2. Develop and analyze a discrete event simulation consistent 
with the systems architecture that identifi es key perfor-
mance drivers and operational decisions that assess poten-
tially confl icting requirements for IAMD and DMO
Architecture Development
Th is paper leverages the Tier 1 Integrated Air and Missile 
Defense architecture created for the Joint Chiefs of Staff  by 
the J6 directorate. By examining the existing IAMD architec-
ture an understanding of the system can be developed, which 
facilitates the creation of an expanded architecture to that can 
be used to analyze the systems and processes necessary to 
execute both IAMD and DMO.
Th e development of a combined DMO and IAMD architec-
ture provides a framework for developing a complete combat 
system design that can satisfy the complex requirements of 
the two diverse warfare areas. Architecture development must 
be done in a methodical and deliberate fashion ensuring that 
all elements of the systems are considered and that relevant 
missions are addressed.
When conducted in a maritime environment, joint forces 
require a wide variety of assets to complete a successful IAMD 
operation. Th e assets required include guided missile cruisers 
(CG) and guided missile destroyers (DDG) equipped with 
BMD capable AEGIS weapon systems. Robust command and 
control systems including link-11, link-16, and cooperative 
engagement capability (CEC). CEC provides a sensor network 
that allows for the exchange of fi re control quality data between 
participating units. Th is fi re control quality data can enable 
extended range engagement opportunities. Engagement of air 
threats is accomplished with standard missile variants SM-2 
and SM-6. Ballistic threats are engaged using SM-3 and SM-6 
for space based engagement and terminal engagement of ballis-
tic targets, respectively. Airborne assets such the F/A-18, E-2D 
and F-35 aid in providing increased situational awareness, 
defense in depth as well as off ensive capabilities. Finally, the in-
clusion of navy integrated fi re control-counter air (NIFC-CA) 
allows for a capability that dramatically 
increases the sensor’s ability and allows 
for missile engagement past ship’s organic 
radar horizon. 
Note that this is a stark contrast to the 
concept of DMO. As currently defi ned, 
IAMD operations rely heavily on robust 
communication paths as well as emis-
sion of high-powered shipboard radars 
to detect and engage missile threats, 
while DMO missions seek to minimize 
all detectable emissions and rely on the 
element of stealth and low probability of 
detection techniques. Th is is important 
to note in the context of the Joint IAMD 
Vision 2020, where the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff  (CJCS) outlines 
imperatives that must be considered 
in future IAMD development. Th e 
fi nal imperative laid out is to “create an 
awareness of the IAMD mission and 
the benefi ts of its proper utilization across the Department of 
Defense to include the development of the enabling framework 
of` concepts, doctrine, acquisition and war plans that support 
full integration of the IAMD into combat operations” (CJCS 
2013). Ensuring that IAMD is fully integrated in the DMO 
concept is consistent with the imperative set forth by the CJCS.
Process
In order to structure the analysis of DMO and IAMD require-
ments, existing guidance from Joint Capability Areas (JCAs) 
and the unifi ed naval task list (UNTL) (DOD 2017) was 
organized per Figure 1. Starting at the top of Figure 1, require-
ments are traced to the mission capabilities as defi ned by JCAs. 
Next, mission capabilities are achieved by utilizing operational 
activities, which are derived through the use of the Universal 
Naval Task List (UNTL).
Th e requirements for a combined IAMD and DMO mission 
consider the relevant elements of both architectures and in-
corporate some overlap of needs. Originating work in Johnson 
(2016) suggested that a distributed force must provide target-
ing, allow for rapid Adaptive Force Package (AFP) turnaround, 
and be self-sustaining. Additionally, there are requirements to 
utilize current/near future resources, be deceptive, operate dis-
persed, force the adversary to react, have limited carrier strike 
group (CSG) support, execute localized sea control, integrate 
Marine Corps, and lastly DMO must be off ensive in nature. 
Th e requirements for IAMD are to be defensive; provide joint 
FIGURE 1. Architecture Development Approach (Adapted from DOD 2017)
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interoperability and integration; sense, track and discriminate 
contacts; provide air control; and provide protection against 
air threats, all while being mobile (CJCS 2012). Broadly, there 
are overlapping requirements for IAMD and DMO that need 
to be integrated into a consistent set of shared requirements. 
Th is research defi nes ten high level requirements for shared 
IAMD/DMO missions. Each requirement is presented using 
an unambiguous, concise statement, which provides a consis-
tent description of the system requirements and provides the 
traceability required in the further development of a functional 
and physical systems architecture.
1. Provide targeting: Th e system shall provide targeting data.
2. Rapid AFP turnaround: Th e system shall allow for rapid 
re-tasking of the adaptive force package.
3. Self-sustaining: Th e system shall sustain itself for the dura-
tion of the mission.
4. Current/Near Future Resources: Th e system shall incorpo-
rate current as well as near future resources.
5. Deceptive: Th e system shall operate in a deceptive manner.
6. Dispersed: Th e system shall operate with dispersed units.
7. Localized control: Th e system shall provide localized sea 
and air control.
8. Operate in joint environment: Th e system shall operate in 
a joint environment.
9. Off ensive: Th e system shall conduct off ensive operations.
10. Defensive: Th e system shall conduct defensive operations.
Based on these initial requirements, the next step in the 
architecture development process is to defi ne the required mis-
sion capabilities. Th e Department of Defense Directive 7045.20 
defi nes a capability as the ability to achieve a desired eff ect 
under specifi ed standards and conditions through a combina-
tion of means and ways across doctrine, organization, training, 
materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities 
(DOTMLPF) to perform a set of tasks to execute a specifi ed 
course of action (DOD 2017). Table 1 presents a tailored listing 
of the mission capabilities and sub-capabilities identifi ed for 
both DMO and IAMD mission.
Each of the developed capabilities is mapped to a require-
ment, while a full matrix of the mapping can be found in Davis 
(2017). Th e objective of this mapping is to guide decomposi-
tion from mission capabilities to operational activities, which 
defi ne the work that is required to achieve each capability and 
is specifi ed independently of how it is to be carried out. For 
the purposes of this research, the Universal Naval Task List 
(UNTL) and specifi cally, the Navy Tactical Tasks (NTAs) are 
used as operational activities. Table 2 contains a tailored listing 
of the NTAs used.
Th e realization of an executable model requires that the 
generic operational activities, which have no real method of ex-
ecution, be further decomposed into operational tasks. Careful 
study of existing architectures and the processes of DMO as 
well as IAMD lead to the creation of three major tasks: plan, 
execute and recover. Figure 2 displays how these operational 
tasks are implemented in an executable architecture model 
(using Innoslate soft ware) and how each can be further broken 
down into subtasks. 
Implementation
Th e operational tasks created are implemented in Innoslate 
by using action diagrams. Th e objective of this defi nition is to 
support both development of a detailed operational simulation 
Mission Capabilities Mission Sub-Capabilities
Surface Warfare
Provide Self-Defense Against Surface Th reats














Suppression of Enemy Air Defensed (SEAD)
Off ensive Counterair Sweep
Escort
Off ensive Counterair Attack Operations
Integrated Air and 
Missile Defense
Defensive Counterair Operations
Th eater Ballistic Missile Defense
Theater Air and 
Missile Defense
Provide Self-Defense Against Air and Missile 
Th reats
Provide Maritime Air and Missile Defense
Provide Overland Air and Missile Defense

















Develop and Maintain Shared Situational 
Awareness
Evaluation and Feedback
TABLE 1. Mission Capabilities and Sub-Capabilities
as well as integration with Department of Defense Archi-
tecture Framework (DoDAF) representations. While action 
diagrams more closely align with LML architecting methods 
than traditional DoDAF compliant methods, they work well 
to provide the structure necessary to create an executable 
architecture. Th e three primary tasks of IAMD depicted using 
action diagrams as shown in Figure 2. Th e planning phase of 
IAMD involves eight major steps. Every IAMD mission begins 
with the receipt of strategic guidance from a higher head-
quarters. Th is guidance is evaluated by the operational chain 
of command consisting of the Unifi ed Commanders, Naval 
component commander, Numbered fl eet commanders, and 
varies task forces, task groups and task units. In the event of 
joint operations, a Joint Force Commander (JFC) is assigned. 
Th e JFC staff  will conduct an operational analysis in which the 
primary purpose is to understand the problem and purpose of 
the operation. Th e JFC will then issue guidance as appropriate 
to enable the remaining planning process. 
At the conclusion of planning, execution of IAMD is broken 
into three major areas and conducted with both operational 
elements as well as tactical assets. Th e fi rst task is observa-
tion of the environment, which is followed by monitoring the 
operational and strategic environments. Th is involves locating, 
assessing, or estimating the adversary’s capabilities as well as 
their limitations and understanding the environment in which 
they will be operating. Enablers for this task are intelligence 
collection, organic sensors as well as remote linked systems. 
Once a contact is detected and suffi  cient information has be 
gathered, the engagement process can move through a decision 
point where a decision maker chooses a defensive counter air 
mission or an off ensive counter air mission. Modeling the en-
gagement process of these tasks is further elaborated in Davis 
(2017). Th e fi nal stage of the IAMD process is recovery. Th is is 
largely an administrative as well as consequence and resource 
management process. 
Th e architectural development of the DMO process closely 
resembles that of the IAMD processes. Th e overall structure of 
the architecture is designed to take advantage of the same three 
basic processes of plan, execute, and recover. Th e plan stages of 
the DMO process and policies are not yet formally developed 
therefore the architecture products created utilize the structure 
developed for the IAMD mission but are adapted to include the 
required surface engagement elements such as developing an 
OPTASK SUW. 
Simulation Development
Discrete event modeling conducted for this research done is 
done in ExtendSim governed by the following basic assump-
tions. Th e model developed considered a complex asymmetric 
environment with multiple threats engaging various AFP con-
fi gurations. Figure 3 provides a general layout of the red force 
assets as well as the blue force engagement elements.
Red force composition includes four broad categories of 
threats, which are ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, aircraft , 
Universal Naval Task List 
(operational activities) Sub-NTA
NTA 1: Deploy / Conduct 
Maneuver
Move Naval Tactical Forces




NTA 2: Develop 
Intelligence




Conduct Special Weapons Attack
NTA 4: Perform Logistics 





NTA 5: Exercise 
Command and Control
Acquire, Process and Communicate 
Information and Maintain Status
Analyze and Assess Situation
Determine and Plan Actions and 
Operations
Direct, Lead and Coordinate Forces
Conduct Information Warfare (IW)
NTA 6: Protect the Force
Enhance Survivability
Provide Security for Operational 
Forces
TABLE 2. Tailored Universal Naval Task List
FIGURE 2. Innoslate IAMD/DMO Overall Process
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as well as integration with Department of Defense Archi-
tecture Framework (DoDAF) representations. While action 
diagrams more closely align with LML architecting methods 
than traditional DoDAF compliant methods, they work well 
to provide the structure necessary to create an executable 
architecture. Th e three primary tasks of IAMD depicted using 
action diagrams as shown in Figure 2. Th e planning phase of 
IAMD involves eight major steps. Every IAMD mission begins 
with the receipt of strategic guidance from a higher head-
quarters. Th is guidance is evaluated by the operational chain 
of command consisting of the Unifi ed Commanders, Naval 
component commander, Numbered fl eet commanders, and 
varies task forces, task groups and task units. In the event of 
joint operations, a Joint Force Commander (JFC) is assigned. 
Th e JFC staff  will conduct an operational analysis in which the 
primary purpose is to understand the problem and purpose of 
the operation. Th e JFC will then issue guidance as appropriate 
to enable the remaining planning process. 
At the conclusion of planning, execution of IAMD is broken 
into three major areas and conducted with both operational 
elements as well as tactical assets. Th e fi rst task is observa-
tion of the environment, which is followed by monitoring the 
operational and strategic environments. Th is involves locating, 
assessing, or estimating the adversary’s capabilities as well as 
their limitations and understanding the environment in which 
they will be operating. Enablers for this task are intelligence 
collection, organic sensors as well as remote linked systems. 
Once a contact is detected and suffi  cient information has be 
gathered, the engagement process can move through a decision 
point where a decision maker chooses a defensive counter air 
mission or an off ensive counter air mission. Modeling the en-
gagement process of these tasks is further elaborated in Davis 
(2017). Th e fi nal stage of the IAMD process is recovery. Th is is 
largely an administrative as well as consequence and resource 
management process. 
Th e architectural development of the DMO process closely 
resembles that of the IAMD processes. Th e overall structure of 
the architecture is designed to take advantage of the same three 
basic processes of plan, execute, and recover. Th e plan stages of 
the DMO process and policies are not yet formally developed 
therefore the architecture products created utilize the structure 
developed for the IAMD mission but are adapted to include the 
required surface engagement elements such as developing an 
OPTASK SUW. 
Simulation Development
Discrete event modeling conducted for this research done is 
done in ExtendSim governed by the following basic assump-
tions. Th e model developed considered a complex asymmetric 
environment with multiple threats engaging various AFP con-
fi gurations. Figure 3 provides a general layout of the red force 
assets as well as the blue force engagement elements.
Red force composition includes four broad categories of 
threats, which are ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, aircraft , 
Universal Naval Task List 
(operational activities) Sub-NTA
NTA 1: Deploy / Conduct 
Maneuver
Move Naval Tactical Forces




NTA 2: Develop 
Intelligence




Conduct Special Weapons Attack
NTA 4: Perform Logistics 





NTA 5: Exercise 
Command and Control
Acquire, Process and Communicate 
Information and Maintain Status
Analyze and Assess Situation
Determine and Plan Actions and 
Operations
Direct, Lead and Coordinate Forces
Conduct Information Warfare (IW)
NTA 6: Protect the Force
Enhance Survivability
Provide Security for Operational 
Forces
TABLE 2. Tailored Universal Naval Task List
FIGURE 2. Innoslate IAMD/DMO Overall Process
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and ships. Th e ballistic threats consider 
three primary threat types: long-range 
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), 
short-range ballistic missile (SRBM), 
and anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM). 
Engagement modeling is not conducted 
for the ICBM. Th e ICBM is only consid-
ered based on the eff ects that it presents 
on the radar systems. Th is includes the 
reduction in the probability of detec-
tion resulting from increased loading 
on the radar processing elements and 
the resulting increase in radar resource 
allocation caused by tracking a com-
plex ballistic target. Th e SRBM as well 
as the ASBM paths are modeled to represent a full detect to 
engage process including the incorporation of layered defense 
against the ASBM. 
Th e detect to engage process depicted on the lower portion 
of Figure 3 by the blue arrows begins with the detection of 
the threat by a given sensor, which is indicated by the arrow 
labeled “Th reat Appears.” Th e model then assigns a weapon 
based upon the kinematics of the target as well as the capabili-
ties of the blue force engagement elements. When the target is 
within weapons release range of an engagement element, the 
engagement will begin. A kill evaluation will take place, and if 
the target has not been destroyed, it will be reengaged. If the 
threat is not destroyed by the fi rst engagement element within 
the assigned engagement window, then additional engagement 
elements will be used as the range is to the threat is reduced. If 
no engagement elements kill the red force threat it is counted 
as a potential hit against the blue force 
target and further analysis is conducted 
to evaluate as a kill. 
Th e number of hits on the blue force 
targets and the percentage of red force 
targets are collected and utilized to eval-
uate the eff ectiveness of both the IAMD 
mission area as well as a combined 
DMO and IAMD mission. Th e scenario 
in Figure 3 includes threats from two 
diff erent anti-ship cruise missiles. ASCM 
threats diff er by the speed of the threat 
and labeled accordingly as ASCM fast for 
a supersonic missile and ASCM slow for 
a subsonic missile. Aircraft  modeling is 
similar and considers an aircraft  type 1 
as a fi ghter type threat and aircraft  type 2 
FIGURE 3. Threat Layout and Blue Force IAMD Capabilities
FIGURE 4. ExtendSim Model Representation
FIGURE 5. Probability of Detection Calculation
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and ships. Th e ballistic threats consider 
three primary threat types: long-range 
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), 
short-range ballistic missile (SRBM), 
and anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM). 
Engagement modeling is not conducted 
for the ICBM. Th e ICBM is only consid-
ered based on the eff ects that it presents 
on the radar systems. Th is includes the 
reduction in the probability of detec-
tion resulting from increased loading 
on the radar processing elements and 
the resulting increase in radar resource 
allocation caused by tracking a com-
plex ballistic target. Th e SRBM as well 
as the ASBM paths are modeled to represent a full detect to 
engage process including the incorporation of layered defense 
against the ASBM. 
Th e detect to engage process depicted on the lower portion 
of Figure 3 by the blue arrows begins with the detection of 
the threat by a given sensor, which is indicated by the arrow 
labeled “Th reat Appears.” Th e model then assigns a weapon 
based upon the kinematics of the target as well as the capabili-
ties of the blue force engagement elements. When the target is 
within weapons release range of an engagement element, the 
engagement will begin. A kill evaluation will take place, and if 
the target has not been destroyed, it will be reengaged. If the 
threat is not destroyed by the fi rst engagement element within 
the assigned engagement window, then additional engagement 
elements will be used as the range is to the threat is reduced. If 
no engagement elements kill the red force threat it is counted 
as a potential hit against the blue force 
target and further analysis is conducted 
to evaluate as a kill. 
Th e number of hits on the blue force 
targets and the percentage of red force 
targets are collected and utilized to eval-
uate the eff ectiveness of both the IAMD 
mission area as well as a combined 
DMO and IAMD mission. Th e scenario 
in Figure 3 includes threats from two 
diff erent anti-ship cruise missiles. ASCM 
threats diff er by the speed of the threat 
and labeled accordingly as ASCM fast for 
a supersonic missile and ASCM slow for 
a subsonic missile. Aircraft  modeling is 
similar and considers an aircraft  type 1 
as a fi ghter type threat and aircraft  type 2 
FIGURE 3. Threat Layout and Blue Force IAMD Capabilities
FIGURE 4. ExtendSim Model Representation
FIGURE 5. Probability of Detection Calculation
as bomber type threat. Finally, a single ship class represents red 
force surface threats with varying numbers of ships deployed 
by the red forces. 
Over 150 input parameters are included in the ExtendSim 
model. Th ere are fi ve major categories of input variables: Blue 
Force Weapon Properties, Blue Force Ship Confi gurations, 
Individual Ship Weapon Confi gurations, Red Force Properties, 
and Operational Variables. Th e Blue Force Weapon Properties 
vary the characteristics, such as cycle time, speed, probability 
of hit of the blue force weapons, notably the SM3, SM6, SM2, 
ESSM, and Tomahawk. Th e Blue Force Ship Confi gurations 
vary the number of ships (DDG, CG, LCS) in the blue force. 
Th e Individual Ship Weapon Confi gurations vary the number 
of each weapon type (SM3, SM6, etc.) aboard each ship. Th e 
Red Force Properties vary both the number, type (such as 
SRBM, ASBM, ICBM, ASCM, and Aircraft ), and characteristics 
(such as range and speed) of the threats. Operational Variables 
defi ne operational decisions, such as the 
weapon selection preference and mission 
type (DMO vs. IAMD vs. combined). 
A full list of variables is available in 
Davis (2017).
It is important to note, the values 
given for weapon capabilities and lim-
itations are not actual values in order to 
avoid the unintentional compromise of 
classifi ed materials. Users of this docu-
ment can apply the correct values on a 
system at the desired level of classifi ca-
tion to assess the results. It is the authors’ 
intent to use values that are within 
reasonable magnitude of the actual to 
produce valid and applicable results.
Simulation Implementation
ExtendSim soft ware modeling incorpo-
rates the architectural representations 
of IAMD and DMO and applies it to 
the scenario detailed in Figure 3. Figure 
4 presents a high-level overview of the 
behaviors represented in the Extend-
Sim model. Note that the probability of 
detection for each of the enemy threats 
is calculated in an initialization sequence 
(shown at the top of Figure 4). Distinct 
sequences for engagement of SRBMs, 
ASBMs, ASCMs (Fast), ASCMs (Slow), 
Aircraft  Type 1 (Fighter), Aircraft  Type 
2 (Bomber) are highlighted in red. Th e sequence for the DMO 
engagement is highlighted in green. Both the red defensive en-
gagements and the green DMO engagement are constrained by 
a shared set of resources (in terms of number of blue force ships 
and number of weapons available to each ship) shown in blue at 
the bottom of Figure 4.
Blue force weapon systems are all assumed to be networked 
and share fi re control quality data with each other. Each ship’s 
sensors have unique probability of detection for their primary 
air search radar as well as their surface search radars. Th e sen-
sor specifi c Pd calculations section of the model applies logic 
that evaluates the number of threats (T) and degrades a base 
probability of detection (Pdbase), for the specifi ed sensor by a 
scaling factor (α,β,…χ) and fi nally aggregates an overall Pda for 
each threat as shown in Equation 1.
Pda = Pdbase –(α × T1)–(β × T2)...(χ × TN) (1)
FIGURE 6. Threat Engagement Section
FIGURE 7. DMO Engagement Logic
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Th e calculated threat Pda for a specifi ed sensor is aggregated 
in Equation 2 to develop an overall probability of detection 
(Pdoverall) for the specifi ed threat. Figure 5 provides additional 
detail regarding the implementation in ExtendSim.
Pdoverall = (1 – ((1 – Pda)(1 – Pdb)...(1 – Pdn) (2)
Th e red areas shown in Figure 4 represent the IAMD por-
tion of the ExtendSim model. Creation of the threats occurs 
independently; however, a common resource pool provides 
necessary elements such as ships, missiles, and guns, as shown 
in Figure 6.
Th e green area is the DMO portion of the model and in-
cludes logic to implement EMCON, mission type changes and 
weapon select logic as shown in Figure 7. Th e implementation 
of EMCON within the simulation merits additional expla-
nation. Th e model assumes a simplifi ed, binary employment 
of EMCON for each Blue asset. Blue assets not employing 
EMCON are free to engage all Red threats. To bound the worst 
case scenario for the Blue Force the ability of Red assets to 
target Blue Forces is agnostic to the EMCON condition, eff ec-
tually assuming that the Red assets are able to detect and target 
the Blue force using some non-electronic support measure 
(ESM) means, thereby compelling the Blue assets to move out 
of an EMCON posture. Note that for off ensive, DMO focused 
engagements the Blue force is able to avoid detection by red 
assets until shift ing out of an EMCON state.
Selection logic for DDG type 1 platform (shown in 
Figure 7) illustrates how, upon exiting the EMCON logic, 
threat routing is based on the weapon preference. A table of 
percentages ranging from 0-100% represents the commander’s 
likelihood of selecting a harpoon, maritime strike tomahawk 
(MST) or SM-6 to engage the red surface threat. Upon selec-
tion, the threat is sent the engagement section of the model.
When conducting anti-surface engagements a command-
er must choose the most eff ective weapon possible. A lack of 
published weapon selection doctrine for DMO, as well as a 
need to explore the impacts of weapon selection on a DMO 
mission, necessitates the use of a weapon select preference 
logic. Th e weapon selection logic is modeled using a space 
fi lling mixture design of experiments (DOE) shown on the left  
of Figure 8. Th e correlation and scatterplot matrix to the right 
provide a visual representation of the design space covered 
by the selected DOE and indicate that the design space is well 
covered for feasible combination of weapon select preferences, 
based on the restriction that requires the sum of the preference 
to be equal to one.
Identifi cation of 150 input factors necessitates the use of a 
DOE capable of exploring a complex design space in a logical 
manner. Th e goal of the DOE is to reduce the correlation be-
tween input variables, which is easily accomplished through 
utilization of orthogonal (or, at least, nearly orthogonal) 
design matrices. Vieira (2012) developed a spreadsheet that 
uses a nearly orthogonal and balanced design (NOB), defi ned 
where, “Nearly orthogonal means that the maximum absolute 
pairwise correlation between any two design columns is 
minimal. Nearly balanced means that for any single factor 
column, the number of occurrences for each factor level is 
nearly equal”. Th e spreadsheet allows for the creation of a 
DOE capable of examining up to 300 input variables using 
512 design points in which 100 of the factors can be contin-
uous and the remaining occur in blocks of 20 k-level discrete 
factors (where k = 2, 3 … 11 levels).
FIGURE 8. Weapon Selection Experimental Design
FIGURE 9. Red Force Losses by Mission Type
Th e NOB design was then crossed 
with the previously created weapon selec-
tion DOE shown in Figure 8, resulting in 
a 5,120-point design. Each of the ten de-
sign points were evaluated against every 
possible combination of factors created 
by the NOB design. Appropriateness of 
the DOE was ensured by testing correla-
tion of factors. With the exception of the 
inherent correlations between the weap-
on selection preferences shown in Figure 
8, the maximum correlation between any 
two design variables was 0.0157, suggest-
ing that the design was appropriate and little correlation exists 
between input variables in the design.
Operational Analysis
Evaluation of the model requires the selection of specifi c 
measure of eff ectiveness (MOE). MOEs are used to assess the 
level of signifi cates that a particular factor has on the response 
variable. Th e two MOEs selected for evaluation in this model 
are the Percent of Targets Destroyed (# of Opposing Forces De-
stroyed Divided by Total Targets) and Blue Force Vulnerability 
(# of Hits of the Opposing Force on Blue Forces).
MOE 1: Percent of Targets Destroyed
Regression analysis was utilized to identify the variables that 
had the largest impact on each MOE. Th e regression analysis 
indicates that mission type is the dominant factor. Mission 
type is defi ned by three possible scenarios: mission type one 
is a purely IAMD mission, type two is a DMO mission while 
mission type three is a combined mission. Th e results focus 
on a comparison of the combined mission and an IAMD 
only mission. Analysis of the mean diff erence in percent of 
red forces lost by mission type indicates that there is also a 
statistical diff erence when viewed by mission type. A mean 
value of 58.5% and maximum value of 97.1% of the red forces 
were destroyed when conducting a purely IAMD mission. Th e 
number of red forces destroyed increased to a mean value of 
69.2% and a maximum of 97.6% when the DMO concept was 
applied in an IAMD environment. Figure 9, created utilizing 
the JMP 13 soft ware package, provides a visual representation 
of the analysis by mission type.
Factor isolation is conducted by removing mission type 
from the modeling eff ects equation and applying it as a variable 
to split the analysis. While removing the mission type from 
the analysis will ultimately decrease the amount of variation 
described by the fi tted model, it allows segmented analysis to 
FIGURE 10. Eff ect Summary by Mission Type 
FIGURE 11. Average Blue Force Losses by Mission Area
FIGURE 12. Blue Force Losses by Mission Type 
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Th e NOB design was then crossed 
with the previously created weapon selec-
tion DOE shown in Figure 8, resulting in 
a 5,120-point design. Each of the ten de-
sign points were evaluated against every 
possible combination of factors created 
by the NOB design. Appropriateness of 
the DOE was ensured by testing correla-
tion of factors. With the exception of the 
inherent correlations between the weap-
on selection preferences shown in Figure 
8, the maximum correlation between any 
two design variables was 0.0157, suggest-
ing that the design was appropriate and little correlation exists 
between input variables in the design.
Operational Analysis
Evaluation of the model requires the selection of specifi c 
measure of eff ectiveness (MOE). MOEs are used to assess the 
level of signifi cates that a particular factor has on the response 
variable. Th e two MOEs selected for evaluation in this model 
are the Percent of Targets Destroyed (# of Opposing Forces De-
stroyed Divided by Total Targets) and Blue Force Vulnerability 
(# of Hits of the Opposing Force on Blue Forces).
MOE 1: Percent of Targets Destroyed
Regression analysis was utilized to identify the variables that 
had the largest impact on each MOE. Th e regression analysis 
indicates that mission type is the dominant factor. Mission 
type is defi ned by three possible scenarios: mission type one 
is a purely IAMD mission, type two is a DMO mission while 
mission type three is a combined mission. Th e results focus 
on a comparison of the combined mission and an IAMD 
only mission. Analysis of the mean diff erence in percent of 
red forces lost by mission type indicates that there is also a 
statistical diff erence when viewed by mission type. A mean 
value of 58.5% and maximum value of 97.1% of the red forces 
were destroyed when conducting a purely IAMD mission. Th e 
number of red forces destroyed increased to a mean value of 
69.2% and a maximum of 97.6% when the DMO concept was 
applied in an IAMD environment. Figure 9, created utilizing 
the JMP 13 soft ware package, provides a visual representation 
of the analysis by mission type.
Factor isolation is conducted by removing mission type 
from the modeling eff ects equation and applying it as a variable 
to split the analysis. While removing the mission type from 
the analysis will ultimately decrease the amount of variation 
described by the fi tted model, it allows segmented analysis to 
FIGURE 10. Eff ect Summary by Mission Type 
FIGURE 11. Average Blue Force Losses by Mission Area
FIGURE 12. Blue Force Losses by Mission Type 
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occur that prioritizes the variables that have the most statistically 
signifi cant impact on performance in each mission type. Figure 
10 shows the results of the factor isolation by mission type.
Th e IAMD mission model developed has a low R2 value of 
0.15, indicating that statistically it may be have limited predic-
tive utility. Th e low R2 value is due to factor isolation necessary 
to view the mission areas separately. Warfare commanders may 
still fi nd that operational utility of the model is still very rele-
vant, and isolation by mission type shows that when conduct-
ing an IAMD mission the dominating factors are the number 
of missiles and performance of those missiles. Analysis of the 
factors infl uencing the combined mission indicates some over-
lap in the necessity for increased numbers of SM2 and SM6.
Statistically signifi cant factors for each mission type are fo-
cused around performance characteristics of blue force missiles 
as well as the numbers of SM2s available to both Cruisers and 
Destroyers. Th e number of SM6s available to Destroyers has a 
signifi cant statistical impact on the performance in both mis-
sion types. Th reat characteristics such as the number and speed 
of threats showed statistical signifi cance as well.
MOE 2: Blue Force Vulnerability
Initial analysis of the data is conducted using simple averaging 
techniques. Th e losses are averaged by mission type and Figure 
11 indicates a small increase in the average number of blue 
forces lost when shift ing from an IAMD mission to a combined 
IAMD/DMO mission. Th e results of this analysis also indicate 
that the most capable platform (DDG Type 3) sustained the 
least losses, while the defended area incurred the most hits. 
Th e LCS and HVU platforms modeling included fewer layered 
defense options in comparison to other platforms and, as such, 
sustained a larger number of hits when compared to the DDGs 
with a layered defense system.
Further analysis to determine the implications of com-
bining an IAMD and DMO mission occur using main eff ects 
screening. Regression analysis of the results indicated that 
the mission type did not have a statistically signifi cant eff ect 
on the number of blue forces lost. Although not statistically 
signifi cant, mission type may be operationally signifi cant, and 
analysis is conducted to examine the impact of mission types. 
EMCON condition showed a statistically signifi cant eff ect and 
will be used for further analysis.
FIGURE 13. Blue Force Losses by EMCON Condition
Top 10 Factors Eff ecting Blue Force Losses
Mission EMCON
IAMD Combined Not in EMCON EMCON
Number of SRBM Number of SRBM Start Range of Aircraft  (Bomber) Number of SM6 on DDGT2
Number of ASCM (Fast) Number of ASCM (Slow) Number of SM2 on DDGT3 Number of SM2 on DDGT3
Number of ASCM (Slow) Number of ASCM (Fast) Number of OASUW on LCS Number of SM2 on Cruiser
Number of Aircraft  (Figher) EMCON Condition Probability of Hit for SM3 Cycle Time for SM3
Number of SM6 on DDGT1 Number of Aircraft  (Bomber) Start Range of ASCM (Slow) Probability of Kill for SM2
Number of SM2 on DDGT3 Number of SM2 on DDGT3 Surface Radar Pd for DDG Type 2 Detection Range for SRBM
Number of SM2 on DDGT1 Number of SM2 on Cruiser Speed of Harpoon Speed of ASCM (Fast)
Number of SM2 on Cruiser Number of SM2 on DDGT2 Max Range of Tomahawk Probability of Kill for Tomahawk
Number of ASBM Number of ASBM Probability of Hit for SM2 Number of CIWS on HVU
Number of of SM6 on DDGT2 Probability of Hit for SM6 Number of SM6 on DDG Type 1 Speed of ICBM
TABLE 3. Top 10 Factors Impacting Blue Force Losses
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Examination of Figure 12 shows that the mean diff erence 
in blue force losses by mission indicates a change from 9.84 
to 10.36 yielding an increase of 0.52 or half a ship loss average 
when conducting a combined DMO/IAMD mission.
Analysis of EMCON conditions (Figure 13) shows losses 
increased from an average of 6.34 blue forces to 7.21 blue 
forces when not in an EMCON condition. Increases may be 
attributed to an EMCON change delay of fi ve seconds, which 
is incorporated in the model to simulate the time required to 
receive indication of a target and subsequently begin radiating 
radars and building a track fi le. 
To determine the primary factors aff ecting blue force losses, 
regression analysis was conducted by mission type as well as by 
EMCON condition. Table 3 provides a summary of the top 10 
factors that impacted blue force losses.
Initial Factor isolation of the blue force losses by EMCON 
condition using regression analysis indicated the numbers of 
threat missiles dominated the results. Th e number of threat 
missiles is not an easily actionable factor; therefore, additional 
regression analysis removed the number of threat missiles as 
potential components of the regression, to isolate additional 
factors of interest. Figures 14 and 15 provide the results of the 
regression analysis.
Th e tailored analysis of the blue force losses by EMCON 
condition results indicate the primary factors for non-EM-
CON mission are the start range of aircraft  type 2, number 
of SM2s on DDG type 3 as well as the number of Off ensive 
Anti-Surface Warfare (OASUW) missiles. Some other 
important factors shown were the speed of the harpoon and 
number of harpoons on the Cruiser. Interestingly, the main 
factors in an EMCON mission were the number of SM-2 and 
SM-6 missiles. Th e probability of kill for the SM2 and toma-
hawk missiles were statistically signifi cant factors discovered 
in the regression analysis. While the results are not defi nitive, 
it is possible that the change in parameter impact by EMCON 
condition can be attributed to a reduced harpoon and tom-
ahawk engagement window due to the increase in detection 
time resulting from the assumed fi ve-second transition from 
an EMCON condition to having sensors available to engage 
the target. Th e higher speed associated with the SM6 and 
SM2 missiles allowed for more engagement opportunities in a 
smaller engagement window than that of the slower OASUW 
and harpoon missiles.
Conclusions
Th is paper developed an integrated architecture that combines 
integrated air and missile defense missions with the proposed 
distributed maritime operations concept. Th e developed 
architecture was used to analyze the performance of the DMO 
factors in an IAMD environment.
Ultimately, the discrete event simulation analysis indicates 
that combined operations can yield nearly an 11% increase 
in red force losses but this benefi t is achieved at the cost of an 
average blue force increase of half a ship (Figure 16). Th erefore, 
FIGURE 14. Tailored Blue Force Eff ect Summary by 
EMCON Condition (Non-EMCON Mission)
FIGURE 15. Tailored Blue Force Eff ect Summary by 
EMCON Condition (EMCON Mission)
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employment of the DMO concept must be weighed against the 
acceptable level or risk allowed for the mission.
Results from the architecture development and subsequent 
execution of the discrete event simulation yield the following 
insights based on the assumptions presented.
1. IAMD and DMO share a large number of requirements as 
well as operational activities; however, it is possible to create 
a shared architecture that can meet the demands of both 
IAMD missions as well as DMO missions.
2. Th ere is a statistically signifi cant diff erence in terms of the 
percent of red forces lost when conducting a IAMD mission 
vs a combined mission, which results in the ability to 
destroy a greater number of red forces 
when conducting a combined mission.
3. Number and performance of blue 
force weapons has a statistically sig-
nifi cant impact of the number of red 
force casualties. 
4. EMCON condition is a distinguish-
ing factor, which must be considered 
when conducting combined oper-
ations. Note that the operational 
simulation model assumed near ideal 
reduction to emissions, if operational 
conditions suggest that this reduc-
tion is not operationally realistic it is 
likely imprudent to attempt to execute 
DMO. As a point of emphasis, future 
research should address varying the employment of EM-
CON across the ships in a fully integrated AFP, rather than 
assuming uniform employment across the AFP.
Th e DMO concept provides for a new and innovative 
approach to warfi ghting that shift s naval tactics to a more 
off ensive paradigm. Th is shift  is one that requires consideration 
in the development of supporting technologies. Th is research 
indicates that by leveraging standardized systems engineering 
tools, and developing architectures that fully embrace off en-
sive and defensive warfi ghting requirements, development of 
systems that can provide the necessary capabilities to achieve 
individual or combined mission sets is promising. 
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